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STATEMENT CLARIFYING MATERIAL FACTS 
Petitioner possesses the good faith belief that he has not 
mis-represented the tactical decision made by Assistant City 
Attorney Nakamura in his September 8, 1992 submission herein to 
concede that it was equally probable that the back injury of 
Petitioner did flow from his industrial accident. True, this 
concession does appear in the Arguments section of that submission. 
However, it also does follow a marshaling of the medical evidence 
by Mr. Nakamura, and Petitioner is unaware of a mandatory, or even 
more commonly used procedure for acknowledging the strengths in the 
other sides case than to do so in argument. Also, if Respondent 
did not believe this case to present a situation of equal 
probability of medical causation, it certainly need not have used 
that phrase at all. 
Petitioner is less convinced than Respondent that there is 
some legal distinction, significant to this case, between saying 
that medical causation is "at least" equally probable, or that it 
is "no more than" equally probable. One statement in the Brief of 
Respondent, though, certainly indicates that the thought process of 
counsel for Respondent back in September of 1992 was exactly what 
his literal words seem to say. "The City was arguing that 
minimally, the medical evidence demonstrated that it was equally 
probable a non-industrial exertion caused petitioner's back and 
neck problems." (Brief, at P.25 emphasis added). The position of 
Petitioner is that the original concession of Respondent was that 
the evidence shows equal probability of medical causation in this 
case at the minimum, rather than at the maximum, and the Brief of 
Respondent does little, if anything, to dispel this conclusion. 
On the subject of medical causation, the same doctor's reports 
that say that Petitioner could not have broken his back in his 
accident without experiencing serious, immediate pain also say that 
the condition of Petitioner need not have come from a fracture at 
all (See the reports of Doctors Anden and Stuart.) Further, they 
say that one of the possible causes of exactly the condition that 
this Petitioner does have is the work accident that he did suffer. 
Dr. James Antinori is the physician who treated Petitioner at 
the Holy Cross Hospital Emergency Room, immediately after his 
accident. Later, in 1991, Dr. Antinori thought it probable enough 
that the accident that he treated the injuries of could also have 
damaged Petitioner's back that he sent him to a specialist for 
evaluation. Respondent agrees that all of this happened just this 
way. Respondent also agrees that this specialist was Dr. Cory 
Anden, and that she concluded in December of 1991 that the 
condition that Petitioner was then suffering from probably had a 
direct cause in his earlier industrial accident. Subsequently, 
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Dr. Anden issued a second report that repudiated her first one, at 
least with respect to its dispositive opinion. However, the second 
report does not say that Petitioner lied to her during the first 
interview, or that she was less than completely professional in 
obtaining from him the information required to support her first 
conclusion, so the second report cannot have completely invalidated 
the first report. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I. 
RESPONDENT IS ARGUING IN FAVOR OF A 
DIFFERENT DECISION THAN THE ONE 
THAT THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
ACTUALLY WROTE 
Since Respondent claims to easily win this case on the "U.C.A. 
35-1-99 issue", Petitioner will put that argument to rest first. 
Petitioner and Respondent will probably agree that the text of the 
"Denial of Motion for Review11 is not a model of clarity. However, 
Petitioner does not believe that it is quite as confusing as 
Respondent appears to find it, either. 
The Administrative Law Judge actually did make as much of the 
application of Section 35-1-99 to the facts of this case as 
Respondent claims. However, there is really no way to say that the 
Commission based its opinion on that part of the decision being 
reviewed by it. The Commission explicitly affirmed only the 
"order" of the Administrative Law Judge, and made no mention of the 
reasoning behind the first order in its own Order. Further, for 
the Commission to have decided the same way that the Administrative 
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Law Judge did (and that Respondent claims that the Commission did) 
it would have had to adopt that decision as its own, or, at the 
very least, to closely track the reasoning thereof in its own 
decision. This the Commission did not do. Rather, it only said 
"This reliance on that statute of limitations to bar applicant from 
recovery was an additional reason to the lack of medical 
causation". Obviously, merely trying to restate what happened 
below is far from the same thing as openly and clearly approving of 
it. 
Though it would obviously be stretching to do so, Petitioner 
realized that it was not impossible that Respondent would claim to 
have won this matter below on the Section 35-1-99 argument. Of 
course, saying "we find that this claim is barred by application of 
the one year statute of limitations of Section 35-1-99", does not 
take 6 pages, and would be the most natural way to say exactly 
that. However, even though the Commissin did not do that, 
Petitioner resolved not to leave anything to chance. 
At P. 8-9 of the Brief of Petitioner is a discussion of the 
merits of the Section 35-1-99 issue. Fitting this into the Brief 
was not easy, because figuring out how Section 35-1-99 fits into 
the decision being appealed, if at all, was not easy. However, it 
is clear that Utah law does not prevent the claim of Petitioner 
from even being heard, and proving that this case could go forward 
at all is a reasonable part of arguing that it should have been 
allowed to proceed on to the medical panel stage. This, then is 
what Petitioner did. What is not reasonable is to claim that an 
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argument that covers nearly two pages just doesn't exist. To 
prevail here, then, Respondent will need this Court to agree that 
a decision that doesn't exist does, and that an argument that 
clearly does exist doesn't. 
Point II. 
THE ENTIRE ANALYSIS OF THE PROPRIETY OF THE 
PREPONDERANCE OF THE EVIDENCE FINDING 
CHANGED AFTER RESPONDENT MADE ITS 
"EQUALLY PROBABLE" CONCESSION 
Petitioner contends that the Industrial Commission did not 
know what to do after Respondent admitted that the respective 
positions of the two sides had approximately equal strength. 
Putting the matter perhaps a bit simply, the parties were tied at 
0% to 0% when the case began, and the one to reach at least 51% of 
the evidence "preponderance" would be declared the winner. After 
Respondent conceded that the facts were equally strong for both 
cases, the parties were tied at 50% to 50%. The Industrial 
commission, though, seems to have only seen the fact that the 
parties were still tied, and to have decided that Petitioner still 
needed to meet his original burden. In reality, the law should be 
that Petitioner should have needed only enough additional evidence 
(on top of the evidence relied upon by Respondent in making the 
decision to offer its concession, i.e. the second report of Dr. 
Cory Anden and the report of Dr. Stuart) at that point in time to 
tip the scale in his favor. Going from 50% of the evidence to 51% 
is far easier than starting from scratch, and the decision of the 
Industrial Commission simply reflects no understanding of this very 
basic proposition. 
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Specifically, the Administrative Law Judge stated "In short, 
there is simply no credible medical or factual evidence that the 
back pain is related to the 1988 fall." (at P. 6, emphasis added) 
Later, and in stark contrast to this, Mr. Nakamura made his 
"equally probable" concession; i.e. agreed that this case was a far 
closer call than the Administrative Law Judge had found it to be. 
In spite of this, the Commission stated "We conclude that there is 
substantial evidence in the file to support the Administrative Law 
Judge's decision when the entire record is considered." (at P.4). 
The basic contention of Petitioner is that the Commission was not 
entitled to support the decision of the Administrative Law Judge 
any more fully than the attorney for the Respondent did. This is 
one of the those times when a party should be bound by the strategy 
of its lawyer. The Commission did not acknowledge this case to be 
a very close one, after the other side had already done that, and 
start its review from that perspective. Accordingly, as the 
Commission clearly did not use the correct standard of review in 
deciding this matter, this case needs to be remanded for further 
consideration. 
CONCLUSION 
The Industrial Commission did not dismiss this claim as having 
been filed in violation of the time limit of U.C.A. 35-1-99, and 
such a ruling would not have been in compliance with the law on 
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that subject, anyway. Rather, remand for further consideration is 
appropriate herein because the Commission did not realize that 
Respondent had relieved Petitioner of the major portion of his 
burden of proof. 
Respectfully submitted this IH day of jwf/ 1993. 
ROBERT BREEZE 
Attorney for Petitioner 
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